22.10.2026, 21:37

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How hunting associations influence policy and the public

When recreational hunting is discussed, much of it comes across as technical common sense. Terms such as “regulation”, “population management” or “Hege” (game stewardship) seem neutral and technical. In reality, interests, power structures and targeted influence lie behind them. In Switzerland, hunting associations are not leisure clubs or heritage societies. They are political actors: at federal and cantonal level, in the authorities, in the media and in European lobbying structures.

JagdSchweiz openly describes its hunting-policy work: forward-looking monitoring of how parties, authorities and organisations form their opinions; close cooperation with “hunting members of the federal parliament”; early development of positions; commissioning studies and publications on current issues. This is not secrecy; it is strategic interest politics with a parliamentary link. At the same time, Swiss hunting association officials sit on the board of FACE, the European hunting lobby organisation in Brussels, which works systematically to secure the killing of wild animals politically in EU legislation. In the Swiss public sphere, this role is rarely made transparent.

This dossier shows how this influence actually arises, through which channels it operates, and why making it visible matters for wildlife protection and democracy. See also our dossier Hunter lobby in Switzerland: how influence works with cantonal case studies, and the dossier Media and hunting topics on the linguistic dimension of this influence.

What awaits you here

  • The role of hunting associations today: interest politics with system character: Why hunting associations are not heritage societies but organised political actors with clear strategic goals at federal and cantonal level.
  • Where influence actually arises: Cantons as the key point, consultation procedures as a political instrument, and personal multiple roles as a structural problem.
  • Parliamentary groups and direct access to parliament: How JagdSchweiz gains direct access to legislative processes through hunting-friendly members of parliament, and what this means for the separation of powers.
  • FACE: Switzerland in the European hunting lobby: Why JagdSchweiz lobbies in Brussels via FACE for more kills, while communicating this nationally as a “nature conservation partnership”.
  • Language as a political tool: How hunting associations set terms that steer debates and delegitimise criticism before the actual political argument even begins.
  • Public relations with expert status: How hunting associations appear in the media as impartial expert bodies although they are interest groups, and why animal welfare organisations structurally get less access.
  • Data control as an instrument of power: Who decides what is documented, how it is documented and which figures become public.
  • Transparency International: What makes the Swiss lobbying system structurally problematic: What the 2019 study finds on covert influence and delicate entanglements in Swiss lobbying, and what this means for recreational hunting.
  • How influence can be made visible: Concrete questions and tools for citizens, the media and politicians.
  • What would need to change: Concrete political demands for greater transparency.
  • Argumentation guide: Answers to the most common counterarguments.
  • Quick links: All relevant articles, studies and dossiers.

The role of hunting associations today: interest politics with systemic character

Over recent decades, hunting associations in Switzerland have become professionalised. They are no longer reactive interest groups responding to motions critical of hunting; they are proactive political actors who anticipate legislation, develop positions early and deploy their networks strategically. JagdSchweiz explicitly names its hunting-policy priorities on its website: monitoring the hunting-policy work of parties, authorities and organisations; close cooperation with hunting members of the federal parliament; developing positions at an early stage; and producing studies and publications on current issues.

This is legitimate interest representation, but it is interest representation, not nature conservation work and not neutral expert advice. The problem arises where this interest representation is perceived as neutral expertise: in contacts with authorities, in media reports, in parliamentary committees. Anyone who does not know that JagdSchweiz is a political organisation with clear strategic goals cannot properly place its contributions to public debates. And it is precisely on this gap in understanding that a considerable part of this lobby's effectiveness rests.

Their core concerns are consistent and have remained stable for decades: securing and expanding the room for manoeuvre of hunters, influencing the enforcement and interpretation of hunting and nature conservation law, and shielding recreational hunting from social and political criticism. These aims are pursued simultaneously at federal and cantonal level, with particular weight placed where enforcement decisions are taken and where the public is least watching.

More on this: Hunter lobby in Switzerland: how influence works and Hunters: role, power, training and criticism

Where influence is actually built

Cantons as the key point

In Switzerland, hunting policy is implemented primarily at cantonal level. This is precisely where hunting associations are particularly present and particularly effective, far more so than at federal level, where debates are more public and parliamentary scrutiny has greater bite. In cantonal advisory commissions, representatives of recreational hunting regularly sit as recognised stakeholders. In exchanges with cantonal specialist bodies (hunting administrations, cantonal veterinarians, forestry offices), implementation guidelines, kill quotas and directives are developed, which are then treated as the "professional standard".

Decisions are often made not in the cantonal parliament but within the administration, in meetings that are not open to the public, between actors whose vested interests are not systematically disclosed. Public attention is low, yet influence is high. Pro Natura explicitly criticised this mechanism when the new Hunting Ordinance (JSV) was issued on 1 February 2025: the ordinance is problematic, it argued, because it expands the potential for kills and weakens protective mechanisms, the outcome of a process in which hunting interests were structurally better placed than nature conservation interests.

Consultation procedures as a political instrument

When laws are revised and ordinances amended, hunting associations regularly take part in consultation procedures. These submissions are publicly accessible, but they are rarely picked up by the media. What stands out is that wording from hunting association submissions frequently reappears almost unchanged in later official documents. In the revision of the hunting act, JagdSchweiz explicitly positioned "no new restrictions on the room for manoeuvre of hunters" as a core demand in its consultation response, a formulation that is clearly reflected in the federal authorities' deliberations.

Personal multiple roles

A structural problem is multiple roles: recreational hunters who simultaneously hold political mandates, sit on cantonal expert commissions or combine functions in hunting, agriculture, forestry and security. These entanglements are often not illegitimate, but they remain systematically undisclosed. Someone who is at once hunting association president, member of the cantonal hunting commission and cantonal councillor carries interests into structures that are supposed to exercise independent oversight. This is not an accusation against individuals; it is a structural weakness of the system.

More on this: Hunting laws and oversight: why self-supervision is not enough and Hunting in Switzerland: figures, systems and myths

Parliamentary groups and direct access to parliament

JagdSchweiz maintains a parliamentary group in the Federal Palace. This group links hunting-friendly members of parliament from different parliamentary parties and serves as a direct transmission belt between the association's interests and legislative processes. Parliamentary groups are legal and widespread in the Swiss political system, but they are also one of the least transparent channels of influence there is.

In its 2019 lobbying study, Transparency International Switzerland sharply criticised the Swiss system: covert influence, delicate entanglements, privileged access. Its central demand: more transparency throughout the entire political decision-making process, consistent documentation and disclosure of lobbying influence (the 'legislative footprint'), and fuller disclosure of mandates and vested interests. These demands have still not been fully implemented, and hunting associations benefit directly from this gap.

In the Federal Palace, this means in concrete terms: a member of parliament who is simultaneously an official of a hunting association, or who issues long-term access badges to association members, creates privileged access that cannot be fully traced in any public register. The result: hunting interests are structurally better embedded in legislative processes than the interests of the 99.7 per cent of the population who do not engage in recreational hunting.

More on this: Problem politicians instead of problem wolves: Switzerland is hunting the wrong animal and Valais wolf balance sheet: figures of a massacre

FACE: Switzerland in the European recreational hunting lobby

On 4 November 2025, the steering committee of FACE (Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation), the European umbrella organisation of hunting associations based in Brussels, met in Rome. The topic: how can the dramatic decline in the number of recreational hunters in Europe be stopped? How should lobbying of the European Parliament and the European Commission be coordinated on migratory bird hunting, small bird hunting and the protection status of large predators?

JagdSchweiz is a member of FACE and sits on the board of this organisation. This means that Swiss hunting association officials are not on the margins of the European hunting lobby; they sit at its decision-making table. When FACE lobbies in Brussels for more migratory bird kills in the Mediterranean region or against the protection status of the wolf under the Bern Convention, it does so with the active participation and support of Switzerland.

In national communications, this role remains systematically invisible. JagdSchweiz emphasises 'biodiversity', 'nature conservation partnership' and 'social mission'. That the same organisation is at the same time part of a European lobby that works systematically to secure and expand wild animal kills politically in EU legislation is hardly ever pointed out in Swiss media. This discrepancy between national self-presentation and European lobbying reality is a central transparency problem. How JagdSchweiz contradicts itself in its own position papers is shown by the analysis of 28 position papers: JagdSchweiz argues against itself; the European context is described by The hunting swamp is everywhere: how FACE and the recreational hunting associations do politics.

More on this: Hunting crisis in Europe: FACE fights for shots, Switzerland remains in the shadows and Wolf in Europe: Politics and recreational hunting versus species protection

Language as a political tool

One of the most effective channels of influence of the recreational hunting lobby is invisible because it operates before any political debate begins: language. Terms set interpretive frames. Whoever controls the language controls what counts as 'reasonable' and what appears 'naive' or 'emotional'.

Classic hunting terms with a political function:

  • 'Regulation' instead of killing: sounds administrative, neutral, necessary.
  • 'Population management' instead of killing wild animals: places living beings within a logic of resources.
  • 'Damage' instead of conflict with human use: places the blame on individual wild animals rather than on the decision about how land is used.
  • «Management» instead of intervention in populations: evokes care while meaning control.
  • 'Problem wolf': sets an interpretive frame in which a specific animal is held responsible for a systemic conflict.

These terms appear not only in association communications but in official documents, parliamentary debates and media reports. Anyone who reads the framing studies knows: whoever sets the term first determines the frame. Criticism formulated outside that frame automatically appears less competent. That is the political effect of linguistic dominance, and hunting associations have it.

More on this: The media and hunting issues: how language, images and «experts» shape the debate and Hunting myths: 12 claims you should scrutinise critically

Public relations with expert status

In media reports, recreational hunters and representatives of hunting associations are regularly introduced as 'experts' without their interests being clearly stated. At the same time, animal welfare and wildlife organisations structurally have less direct access to authorities and the media. This is not a conspiracy but a result of organisational capital: hunting associations are large, well connected, well funded and experienced with the media. They quickly supply statements that editorial teams use as 'expert assessment' without placing the vested interest in context.

JagdSchweiz demonstrably works with professional PR support. The Lucerne communications agency media-work accompanies JagdSchweiz as a 'sparring partner for the president, the board and the head office'. What appears in a local newspaper as the 'assessment of the hunting community' is in many cases the result of professionally prepared association communications. This origin is not disclosed in any of the resulting media reports. That is the structural problem: not that public relations exist, but that they pass as expert opinion.

One example is the 'Jagdbarometer'. Every two years, JagdSchweiz commissions the institute DemoScope to carry out a survey of the general population of around 1,005 people, not a survey of recreational hunters, and after every scandal it points to the approval ratings, most recently in 2026 after the uproar over a Grisons trophy photo. Questions such as whether recreational hunting is 'needed for regulation' already presuppose the regulation thesis. Independent surveys such as the forest monitoring programme WaMos 2 paint a different picture: 79 per cent of the population have reservations about recreational hunting or reject it. A survey commissioned by the association is therefore not suitable as an argument (Hunting barometer 2025: What JagdSchweiz's survey leaves out and fact-check of the JagdSchweiz brochure).

More on this: The media and hunting issues: how language, images and «experts» shape the debate and Psychology of hunting: Why people kill animals

Data control as an instrument of power

Whoever decides which data are collected, how they are analysed and which of them are made publicly available controls the foundation of every political debate. In recreational hunting, actors close to hunting enjoy a structural advantage in controlling data: cantons often compile hunting statistics with the support or participation of hunting administrations whose staff and culture are close to recreational hunting. Missed shots are not recorded systematically. Animal welfare violations during hunting have no uniform reporting obligation. The effectiveness of alternative wildlife management measures is rarely documented in a format comparable with hunting statistics.

The result is a structural information asymmetry: hunting associations can point to figures that match their positions. Critics often cannot, not because the data do not exist, but because independent surveys are lacking. This asymmetry is no coincidence. It is the result of decades of political work that has prevented independent oversight and independent data collection in recreational hunting, because both would be inconvenient for the lobby.

More on this: Recreational hunting and biodiversity: does it protect nature? and Dubious Swiss hunting authorities

Transparency International: What makes the Swiss lobbying system structurally problematic

In its 2019 lobbying study, Transparency International Switzerland clearly identified the structural weaknesses of the Swiss system: covert influence, delicate entanglements, privileged access and inadequate disclosure requirements. Its central demand: greater transparency throughout the political decision-making process, consistent documentation of lobbying influence, fuller disclosure of mandates, and sanctions for breaches of reporting obligations.

For recreational hunting, the Swiss lobbying system means concretely this: a small, well-organised interest group can structurally exert more influence on hunting and nature conservation legislation than its social base would warrant. This is not specific to recreational hunting; it applies to many sectors in Swiss corporatism. But it is particularly consequential in the case of recreational hunting, because the decisions taken affect the lives and deaths of tens of thousands of wild animals every year and touch on biodiversity goals that are relevant to society as a whole.

More on this: Hunter lobby in Switzerland: how influence works and Introduction to hunting criticism

How influence can be made visible

Transparency begins with concrete questions. Anyone seeking to assess hunting-policy statements, decisions or media reports should ask the following questions:

  • Who is speaking here, and in what capacity? Is the person an association official, a member of parliament with a hunting mandate, a cantonal civil servant or an independent wildlife researcher?
  • At what level is the decision really made? In parliament, in the administration, in a committee, and is that level open to the public?
  • Which terms are used, and what do they conceal? 'Regulation' instead of killing, 'damage' instead of conflict over use: who sets the term, and whose interpretive framework does it reflect?
  • Who is not at the table despite being affected? Wildlife research, animal welfare organisations, the majority of the population with no recreational hunting interests.
  • Which data are cited, and who collected them? Statistics compiled by the hunting association itself, official data gathered with the hunting association's involvement, or independent research findings?

These five questions are the basic toolkit for critically assessing hunting-policy communication: in media reports, in political debates and in official documents.

More on this: template texts for hunting-critical motions in cantonal parliaments and Hunt Watch: Turning the focus onto people who kill animals

What needs to change

  • Legislative footprint for hunting legislation: Every attempt to influence hunting and nature conservation legislation must be documented and publicly accessible: who communicated with whom, when and in what format. Transparency International Switzerland demands this for the entire lobbying system, and it would be especially urgent for hunting-policy decisions.
  • Disclosure obligation for multiple roles in hunting committees: Anyone who is simultaneously an association official and a member of a cantonal expert committee must declare this dual role at every relevant meeting and vote. Conflicts of interest can only be assessed if they are visible.
  • Independent wildlife research in hunting-policy bodies: Cantonal expert committees on hunting and wildlife management must structurally include wildlife biologists, behavioural ecologists and animal welfare representatives, not merely in an advisory capacity but with the same voting rights as hunting association representatives.
  • Transparency about FACE membership and European lobbying activity: JagdSchweiz must disclose, in its communication with authorities and the media, its FACE membership and the specific positions FACE advocates in Brussels. An organisation that presents itself nationally as a 'conservation partner' while acting as a hunting lobbyist at European level owes the public this transparency.
  • Independent data collection on recreational hunting: Missed shots, animal welfare violations, impacts on wildlife populations and biodiversity indicators must be recorded and published by independent institutions (FOEN, WSL, universities), without the recreational hunting lobby having any say in the methodology or evaluation.
  • Template motions: template texts for hunting-critical motions in cantonal parliaments and Template text: Transparent hunting statistics in the canton

Talking points

“Lobbying is legitimate in a democracy, including for hunting associations.” Yes. Lobbying is legitimate when it is transparent, discloses vested interests and takes place within democratically legitimate rules. According to Transparency International, the Swiss lobbying system does not meet these requirements. The problem is not lobbying as such, but structurally privileged access without transparency.

“Recreational hunters sit on commissions because they have expertise.” Experience in the field is valuable. But recreational hunters have structural conflicts of interest: they pay for the right to kill and benefit directly from enforcement decisions that favour hunting. Wildlife biologists, ethologists and animal welfare representatives do not have these conflicts of interest. Both perspectives belong at the table, but today there are structurally too many of the one and too few of the other.

“JagdSchweiz represents around 30,000 recreational hunters, which is democratically representative.” According to the Federal Hunting Statistics, there were 29,328 hunters in Switzerland in 2025 (in 2000 there were still 33,593), which is around 0.3 per cent of the population. According to the independent WaMos 2 survey, 79 per cent of the population have reservations about recreational hunting or reject it. The question of representativeness is therefore clear. The problem is not that 0.3 per cent are allowed to have their interests represented; the problem is when these interests structurally carry more political weight than those of the remaining 99.7 per cent.

“FACE membership is international cooperation, not lobbying.” FACE is registered in the EU Transparency Register as a lobbying organisation. It itself names its lobbying work in Brussels as a core task. Membership of the FACE board is participation in a lobbying organisation, not nature conservation cooperation.

“Without hunting associations, politicians would have no contact partners for wildlife management.” Wildlife management needs expertise, not hunting associations. Professional game warden structures, wildlife biology institutes, specialist departments of the Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) and cantonal veterinarians can support wildlife management on a professional basis, without the structural conflict of interest that arises when those who regulate are also those who use.

Articles on Wild beim Wild:

Related dossiers:

Our Standard

Lobbying is legitimate in a democracy. What is not legitimate is privileged access without transparency, conflicts of interest without disclosure, and control of data without independent review. The recreational hunting lobby uses the Swiss lobbying system in the way it can be used for as long as its weaknesses remain unaddressed. This is not an accusation against individual recreational hunters. It is a structural argument for reform.

IG Wild beim Wild documents these structures because a democracy that takes wildlife protection and biodiversity seriously must know who is influencing the rules by which wild animals may live and die, and how, and to what end. Influence becomes visible once you start asking the right questions. That is the beginning.

If you know of tips, documents or current cases that belong in this dossier, send them to us. Good information is the foundation of every effective critique.

More on the topic of recreational hunting: in our hunting dossier we bring together fact checks, analyses and background reports.