Lobbyists as Judges: Dual Roles in Hunting Affairs

Taking a stroll through the village is a wonderfully calming affair. The birds are chirping, the trees are rustling, and somewhere someone is practising the hunting horn. Not because they have the talent for it, but because tradition, as everyone knows, requires no musical scale.

In a democracy, the law should be impartial. But what happens when individuals who actively lobby in hunting affairs as executive directors simultaneously assume sovereign functions — for example, as justices of the peace in the canton of Aargau? The case of the association JagdSchweiz and its representative illustrates how these dual roles can become a serious threat to the credibility of the administration of justice and mediation.

When a person simultaneously serves as executive director of an interest group — in this case the militant association JagdSchweiz — and assumes a public office with a quasi-judicial function, there is a fundamental risk that perceived or potential conflicts of interest may arise.

The issue is not necessarily that an actual conflict exists, but that people may reasonably question whether professional interests and neutral dispute resolution remain fully separate.

The executive director of an association represents clearly defined interests. A justice of the peace, by contrast, is required to be impartial. The office of justice of the peace relies heavily on the trust of the parties involved. Any strong external affiliation can be called into question, even if the individual carries out their duties objectively and with integrity. Should cases ever arise that indirectly involve hunting- or wildlife-related aspects, the question of impartiality could come to the fore. In quasi-judicial functions, it is generally expected that conflicts of interest are either avoided or disclosed.

It merely means that the roles naturally fulfill different expectations, which is why observers might find the combination noteworthy.

When hunting policy is debated in Switzerland, two worlds often clash: an increasingly aware public raising ecological and ethical questions, and interest groups fighting to preserve traditional structures. Accordingly, the public watches closely when representatives of such associations simultaneously hold public offices, particularly those of a conciliatory or trust-based nature.

A broader issue is currently moving further into the spotlight: How compatible is it when functionaries of an interest group simultaneously hold a quasi-judicial office? And more specifically: Where is the line between a legitimate dual role and an unlawful or impermissible conflict of interest?

In a militia democracy like Switzerland, it is common for citizens to hold several roles simultaneously. Many municipal authorities, commissions, and conciliation bodies function precisely for this reason.

A dual role is generally considered legitimate when the following conditions are met:

• Disclosure of professional or association-related activities
• No direct thematic overlap between the office and the association
• Voluntary recusal in cases where a conflict of interest may exist
• No obligation to follow instructions from an association in the exercise of the office
• Clear legal foundations that preclude incompatibility

As long as these prerequisites are in place, a militia-based political system can function in a pluralistic manner.

It becomes problematic and in some cases unlawful when:

• An association could derive direct benefit from the officeholder role
• Official decisions could improperly influence the representation of interests
• Thematic proximity exists that compromises perceived or actual independence
• Recusal rules are not observed or are not clearly defined
• The office exercises a judge-like authority for which complete neutrality is a fundamental requirement

Judicial and quasi-judicial functions in particular, such as justice of the peace offices, must meet especially high standards. The Federal Supreme Court has held in several rulings that even the appearance of bias is sufficient to call independence into question.

And it is precisely here that David Clavadetscher, the new justice of the peace in Zofingen, has failed miserably on more than one occasion in the past: «Disruptive contemporaries should be "silenced" and "disappear from the scene". His daily work at Sandona GmbH consists of representing the particular interests of certain associations. Anyone who previously supported or participated in coordinated campaigns to “silence” individual citizens does not come across as neutral. The documented desire to make a critic “disappear” through legal means is difficult to reconcile with judicial independence. The mere appearance suffices. The formulation that multiple criminal complaints are intended to make someone “disappear from the scene” makes the purpose of those complaints appear dubious.
This contradicts the rule-of-law principle, which is fundamental for persons holding judicial office.

Those who represent interests are welcome to attack, agitate, demand and trumpet, but please not simultaneously mediate conflicts.

Why particular sensitivity is required in the area of hunting

Hobby hunting is one of the most politically and emotionally charged issues in Switzerland. Decisions relating to wildlife affect biodiversity, ecology, animal welfare and land use — areas in which powerful interest groups are active.

Accordingly, close scrutiny is applied when:

• Lobbying organisations help shape public law
• Representatives of such organisations simultaneously assume sovereign functions
• Association positions are closely intertwined with political or legal processes
• Natural science vs. hunting tradition
• Animal welfare vs. “population control”
• Ecology vs. folklore
• Strategic communication vs. “We are right because we have always done it this way”

Even the impression that an office might be biased undermines trust in state structures. For a system built on proximity to citizens and the militia principle, this is particularly sensitive.

Dual roles are not inherently problematic in the Swiss system. However, where a mandate requires neutrality, the capacity to mediate, or judicial distance, one principle must apply: the representation of interests and the administration of justice must not mix.

To prevent abuse, bias, or even the mere appearance of undue influence, the following are needed:

• Stricter statutory incompatibility rules
• Clear rules on recusal
• Proactive transparency
• Official bodies that systematically examine dual roles

The public's trust is finite, especially in areas where powerful associations are active. A modern understanding of the rule of law therefore demands that conciliation offices remain free of entanglements that give rise to doubts about their independence.

Why the Office of Justice of the Peace in the Canton of Aargau Requires Closer Scrutiny

In the Canton of Aargau, a fundamental constitutional value is currently being affected: the independence of sovereign functions in connection with association activities, particularly in environments critical of hunting. When, for example, senior representatives of interest groups — such as those involved in the hunting establishment — simultaneously hold or have held the office of Justice of the Peace in the Canton of Aargau, the question arises: Where does the legitimate militia function end and where does the incompatibility of interests begin?

Demands by IG Wild beim Wild for Greater Clarity and Quality

1. Definition of Clear Incompatibilities
   The canton should examine whether existing standards are sufficient. For example: a person who is professionally involved in managing hunting associations should, where appropriate, be excluded from offices in which law is adjudicated or mediated.
2. Obligation to Disclose and Recuse
   Every person holding both an association role and a sovereign office should issue a public statement indicating in which cases they will recuse themselves. It should likewise be documented that recusal has taken place in such cases of conflict.
3. Establishment of an Independent Oversight Body
   Not only at major courts, but also at militia offices such as Justice of the Peace positions, a body should monitor compliance with incompatibility and recusal rules.
4. Public Awareness
   Citizens should know who their Justice of the Peace is and what secondary activities he or she pursues. This requires transparency.

In the Canton of Aargau, the following applies: the office of Justice of the Peace is not a merely formal honorary position — it exercises sovereign functions. And it is precisely for this reason that one must not lose sight of the following: when the same person simultaneously acts in a lobbying capacity, it may not be prohibited, but it does raise serious questions — about independence, trust, and democratic legitimacy.

At a time when voices critical of hunting are becoming massively louder, it would be fatal if the standards of neutrality and recusal were held to a less rigorous standard precisely in the so-called minor “militia offices” than in major courts. The time for clear rules and transparent disclosure has come.

Anti-hunting backgrounds – the association and its methods

The critical reporting by the interest group IG Wild beim Wild already made clear how JagdSchweiz operates:

• The association was convicted in a court case in Bellinzona due to its conduct against IG Wild beim Wild, or at the very least its reputation and legitimacy were severely damaged.
• The criticism is directed at a culture of intimidation, propaganda, violence, animal cruelty, and the pursuit of vested interests at the expense of wildlife and the environment.
• When representatives of such associations simultaneously hold public offices — for example as justices of the peace — a militia function quickly becomes a position of power with direct influence over disputes that could also involve hunting-critical issues.

It is an image that unsettles: while hunting associations have for years used every means at their disposal to secure political influence, shape wildlife policy, and manipulate public debate, some of their leading representatives simultaneously find themselves in roles that expressly require neutrality, impartiality, and judicial detachment. A similar case recently occurred in the canton of Thurgau.

In the canton of Aargau, this concerns in particular the office of justice of the peace — a position that enjoys considerable trust in Switzerland’s militia democracy. Or rather: that should enjoy such trust.

For what happens when an interest group that is regularly under fire in hunting-critical debates simultaneously provides individuals who are supposed to mediate legal disputes? The result is the impression of a system in which the guardians of the law and the advocates of vested interests stand far too close together.

An association under pressure and a democracy under stress

Recreational hunting is one of the most emotionally charged and politically contentious fields in Switzerland. Associations active in this arena are frequently caught in the crossfire of criticism and counter-criticism — including the militant JagdSchweiz. The Swiss Animal Protection (STS) has severed all contact with these perpetrators of violence.

In publicly accessible sources and journalistic contributions, the association has repeatedly been accused of a confrontational communication style. Critical voices report that hunting organizations occasionally resort to hardball and dishonest tactics in political and media disputes.

• Dramatization
• Defamatory outrage
• Intimidation
• Threats
• Violence
• Lies
• Silencing
• Suppression of criticism
• Abuse of legal process
• Media howling at the full moon
• And of course the daily dose of “We are the last ones who truly understand nature!”

Such accusations, regardless of how one evaluates them, illustrate a fundamental problem: An interest group pursues interests. A justice of the peace is meant to create peace. These are two roles that do not merely collide logically, but represent fundamentally different cultures, objectives, and values.

This is not about opposition to hunting — it is about democracy. About the question of how much proximity between lobbying and the administration of justice we are willing to tolerate.

And about the fact that those who represent interests should not simultaneously be the ones who adjudicate conflicts. For a democracy that does not take dual roles seriously does not take itself seriously.

The hunting issue is among the most conflict-laden policy areas of all. It is not merely opinions that clash — it is entire worldviews.

And it is precisely within this complex environment that representatives of such interest-driven phalanxes are suddenly supposed to step into quasi-judicial roles?

From a political standpoint, that is roughly as credible as a hunting horn playing “Imagine” by John Lennon.

Democracy only functions when responsibilities are clearly separated: Those who fight political battles should not simultaneously mediate conflicts. Those who represent interests should not sit in judgment. Those who exercise interest-driven power should not pretend to be neutral.

In the view of IG Wild beim Wild, hobbyhunters require annual medical-psychological fitness assessments modeled on the Dutch system, as well as a binding upper age limit. The largest age group among hobby hunters today is 65+. Within this group, age-related impairments such as declining visual acuity, slowed reaction times, reduced concentration, and cognitive deficits increase markedly on a statistical basis. At the same time, accident analyses show that the number of serious hunting accidents involving injuries and fatalities rises significantly from middle age onward.

The regular reports of hunting accidents, fatal errors, and the misuse of hunting weapons highlight a structural problem. The private ownership and use of lethal firearms for recreational purposes largely evades continuous oversight. From the perspective of IG Wild beim Wild, this is no longer justifiable. A practice based on voluntary killing that simultaneously generates considerable risks for humans and animals forfeits its social legitimacy.

Hobby-hunting is furthermore rooted in speciesism. Speciesism describes the systematic devaluation of non-human animals solely on the basis of their species membership. It is comparable to racism or sexism and can be justified neither culturally nor ethically. Tradition is no substitute for moral scrutiny.

Critical scrutiny is particularly indispensable in the area of hobby hunting. Hardly any other field is so thoroughly shaped by euphemistic narratives, half-truths, and deliberate disinformation. Where violence is normalised, narratives frequently serve the purpose of justification. Transparency, verifiable facts, and an open public debate are therefore essential.