Model text: Entanglement of hunting administration and associations
1. Motion
The cantonal government is mandated to present to the cantonal parliament a draft amendment to the Law on Hunting and Wildlife Protection (… law designation …) and the Hunting Ordinance (… ordinance designation …) that makes transparent the personal and institutional entanglements between the cantonal hunting administration and hunting associations in canton (…) and prevents conflicts of interest through binding incompatibility regulations. The legislative revision must particularly ensure that
- all persons entrusted with hunting policy tasks in the cantonal hunting administration, hunting commissions, expert committees or advisory bodies must disclose their memberships, functions and financial connections to hunting associations
- a binding incompatibility regulation is introduced that prohibits persons from simultaneously being active in the cantonal hunting administration and in leadership functions of hunting associations
- hunting commissions and advisory committees are composed on equal terms, so that animal welfare organizations, nature conservation agencies and the public are represented on equal footing
- the cantonal government publishes a complete overview of all personal entanglements and updates it annually
In particular, it must be legally regulated that
- employees of the hunting administration who simultaneously hold a hunting license must disclose this
- the financial flows between canton, municipalities and hunting associations are publicly disclosed annually
- Recusal obligations apply when members of hunting commissions deliberate on matters affecting their own hunting interests
2. Brief Justification
The Hobby hunting starts at the desk. In many cantons, the personal connections between hunting administration and hunting associations are so close that independent oversight can hardly be said to exist. The same people who create culling plans in the administration are active as recreational hunters in their spare time and organized in the associations.
This personal union would be unthinkable in any other area of public administration. The hunter lobby in Switzerland functions so effectively precisely because the boundaries between association and administration are fluid.
The consequences are severe: Culling quotas are set by recreational hunters who have a material interest in high culls. Complaints from animal protection organizations end up at offices dominated by recreational hunters. This motion calls for transparency and disentanglement.